Introduction
During his opening keynote address at the 2014 ASEE Annual Conference and Exposition in Indianapolis, Purdue University President and former Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels spoke on the future of engineering education. When the question arose as to how American universities such as Purdue were responding to the Bologna Process Daniels offered a telling reply. Referring the typical 3+2 year degree program structure endorsed by European higher education ministers following the 1999 Bologna Declaration, Daniels latched onto the possibility of shortening U.S. engineering degree programs to just three years, in a move consistent with his conservative fiscal agenda and reputation.
Many engineering faculty at Purdue worried about Daniels when he was first brought to Purdue to serve as its President, but as his address at the 2014 Annual Conference made clear, he turned out to be a major advocate for the engineering program at Purdue, and across the nation. Steeped in the context of underlying concerns about economic globalization, and the role that a highly trained workforce would play in maintaining the competitive posture of the United States, Daniels viewed engineers as part of the solution, not a part of the problem in shifting to the next stage of our postindustrial economy.
Still, Daniels' response was instructive. Not only was he not cognizant of the subtleties of the 3+2 degree program structure-e.g., the emphasis placed on the Candidate's degree (an equivalent to the master's degree in the U.S.)-but he seemed ignorant about the Bologna Process itself, despite his current occupation as a university president. In fairness, Daniels is hardly alone. A number of U.S. educational policymakers and observers have been straining for years to direct U.S. educators' attention to the Bologna Process, yet as late as 2006, even a policy body as important as the former Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings' Commission on the Future of Higher Education failed to take note of the Bologna Process in its report. As noted by Clifford Adelman, a senior associate with the Institute for Higher Education Policy, "such purblind stances are unforgivable in a world without borders," because Adelman believes "the core features of the Bologna Process have sufficient momentum to become the global higher education model within the next two decades." 1 The inadequate awareness of the Bologna Process in the U.S. has begun to shift as a result of a number of policy documents and studies circulated since the late 2000s. Nevertheless, the subtleties of how the process has been unfolding in Europe, and its relevance to engineering educators, remains to be understood. Especially because of the current U.S. interest in improved assessment models, much of U.S. policymakers' attention has been directed to one core feature of the Bologna-the transparency and measurability of learning outcomes, which are necessitated by the fluid transfer of students across institutions under the 3+2 model. Other major features of the Bologna, including the technical workforce issues that animate the process and the subtle variations in its implementation, have drawn even less attention.
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In this paper, we explore a more nuanced understanding of the Bologna Process for engineering educators in the U.S. Drawing examples from engineering education in Denmark, we describe how a European country interprets and responds to the Bologna Process according to its national political tradition, economic priorities, and workforce conditions. We also document the diverse strategies adopted by different Danish universities and colleges to navigate and enhance their own positions in the harmonization of regional higher education market. We discuss the implications of these institutional responses for U.S. engineering education at the end of this paper.
A Note on the Method
The data presented in this paper is collected from a two-week visit of Danish universities and colleges and interviews of engineering educators and administrators. The first author of this paper was invited to serve as an international advisor for the Program of Research on Opportunities and Challenges in Engineering Education in Denmark (PROCEED), a research project funded by the Danish Strategic Research Council. PROCEED was initially conceived to understand the consequences of Bologna for Danish engineering education with bottom-up data from specific domains of engineering education and practice. However, as the work of PROCEED unfolded, it became apparent that a robust understanding of local responses could not be attained without also understanding the institutional context. In 2012, the two authors of this paper were asked to carry out an analysis of the Danish engineering schools' institutional responses to Bologna. We were joined in this task by other members of the PROCEED research group, namely Søsser Broadersen, Anders Buch, Rikke Premer Petersen, and Andres Valderrama. Each joined us as a member of at least one site visit team.
This study was cast as a multi-site, multi-scale analysis of institutional responses to new Danish national educational policies stemming from the Bologna Process. The site selection was left to our hosts, namely the co-investigators and staff members of the PROCEED program. The four institutions that we studied were Aalborg University (both the Aalborg and Copenhagen campus); Aarhus University (including Ingeniørhøjskolen i Århus (IHA)), Ingeniørhøjskolen i København (IHK); and Danmarks Tekniske Universitet (DTU). While IHK is now a part of DTU, we refer to it in this paper as a separate institution in following the institutional pattern that existed at the time of our study.
Our primary method of data collection was semi-structured interviews, which were conducted under the general model of a U.S. external program review. Individual interviews were typically 60-90 minutes in length, where we asked a series of questions related to institutional history, awareness of the policy environment, and institutional responses. These were supplemented by additional questions designed to triangulate on the nature of the response, as framed around issues of curriculum, pedagogy, resources, student experiences, and learning outcomes. Three to seven interviews were carried out at each of four institutions, with stakeholders from different levels within the organization extending up to a Dean or Rektor (President). A total number of 16 interviews were conducted. While it was our intent to interview students, a misunderstanding about the needs of multi-scale analysis left us with student interviews at only one of the field sites. A limited amount of general field observations were carried out to supplement what we found through our interviews. Page 26.975.3
The interviews were digitally recorded divided into segments according to interview questions (e.g., major goals of the university and program, adequacy of resources and facilities, student learning outcomes, etc.). We did an approximate transcription of the interviews. During and after the site visits, we frequently exchanged our findings and understandings of each institution's strategies, challenges, and achievements with our Danish colleagues in the PROCEED team. These conversations formed the generic codes (e.g., innovation economy, geography and scale, etc.) that guide our data analysis. With these generic codes we went through the approximate interview transcriptions, marked the relevant quotes, and used these quotes to refine our units of analysis. Three months after the site visits, we drafted four "whitepapers"-one for each sitethat summarize our findings. These whitepapers were circulated to our interviewees and our Danish colleagues in the PROCEED team for verification and feedback. The whitepapers and the received comments form the basis of this paper.
We should note that this study is far from complete. With just 10 days to carry out the interviews, and no interviews of officials within Denmark's ministries, this can only be considered a preliminary look at the institutional responses in Denmark. We also note that our access at DTU was also limited by a recent, controversial decision on the part of one of the PROCEED co-investigators to relocate from DTU to Aalborg University. We believe our findings to be of significant interest to engineering educators in the United States. While the full findings of our study will be released in an edited volume produced by the PROCEED project, a summary of our findings is presented here for the ASEE audience. In the following section, we first present a brief introduction of the Bologna Process and the diverse reactions to it across nations and institutions.
Varied National and Institutional Responses to the Bologna Process: The Significance of the Danish Case
The Bologna Process was initiated through a 1999 ministerial meeting involving the education ministers of 29 European countries. While expectations of professional labor mobility accompanied the Treaty of Maastricht, given the financial and monetary-policy orientation of the early conversations about European integration, an explicit focus on higher education and workforce development was absent from these conversations. The main concern behind Bologna was that European universities, despite their reputation, were not producing the quantity or quality of graduates necessary for Europe to "succeed" in the global economy. 2 Following the general logic of economic globalization and the neoliberal principles that served as a guide to European integration, a basic decision was made to place European higher education institutions in competition with one another by creating a single higher education market. 3 Yet although the most well-known feature of the Bologna Process has been the development of a European Higher Education Area built around a 2-cycle degree program consisting nominally of 3+2 years of study, the Bologna Process has produced other phenomena that may be of greater interest and concern to educators outside of Europe. Perhaps the most notable of these other changes has been the emergence of more specialized degree programs at the Candidate's level, due to the cross-institutional specialization made possible by the larger educational market and the mobility of students across Europe. While the uptake of this option to create more specialized degrees has varied from country to country, and as we shall see, from institution to institution, many of these new degree programs are specifically tied to new regional Page 26.975.4
industries with a high-tech, or high value-added focus. 4 The incorporation of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, with its focus on research and vocational training, has also expanded the scope of Bologna to include third cycle (PhD programs) and short-cycle (2-year technical vocational) educational programs into the policy picture. 5 In recognizing the diversity and diverse strengths of their educational systems, the Education ministers were unwilling from the outset to standardize their degree program or degree content through accreditation. Thus, although the ministers were willing to standardize the structure of the degree programs offered across Europe (although significant variants persist), beyond this, the emphasis was on "harmonizing" their different systems through transparency and accountability. A pre-existing system known as the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), which was developed to facilitate student transfers and study abroad agreements, was remade into a robust system for faculty to make visible the content of their courses, and be held accountable for student success through a "quality assurance" regime. To provide a flavor of the current approach, faculty are required to specify the number of hours students need to spend to learn specific content; academic credit as well as faculty course loads are then assigned using this measure, even as the specified learning outcomes provides the basis for determining what degree programs students are qualified to enter at the start of the second cycle. This means that Europe has embraced a learning outcomes regime far more extensive than anything required by ABET EC 2000's accreditation protocols. 6 As an institutional historian and an ethnographer of educational institutions, we have reason to believe that the changes brought about by the Bologna Process will not occur all together suddenly, or in any uniform way. A couple of "facts" will help situate our own reading of the Bologna Process. First, the Bologna Process has been built on the premise of "harmonization," not "unification" (as in the "EU"), based on the understanding that Europe possessed highly diverse systems of higher education that few ministers wished to unify. Second, there has been ample institutional resistance, both at the level of individual institutions, and at the national level. Thus, if we follow the national benchmarks provided in the biennial assessment of the Bologna Process that were initiated in 2005, several countries, most notably France and Germany, stand out as places where the Bologna Process has been unfolding more slowly. With some of the most elite systems of higher education in Europe, there has been little incentive within the leading countries to embrace Bologna as a way of gaining more students through market mechanisms. At the institutional level, a typical strategy for undercutting the Bologna Process has been to create an arbitrary point of demarcation within an existing 5-year degree program, and to encourage all Diplom graduates to continue their studies at the same university after completing the lower degree. At such institutions, there has been little in the way of genuine curriculum reform designed to create a meaningful articulation between the lower and higher degrees, and little encouragement for students wishing to transfer into more specialized programs at the master's level.
We also see significant variation in the responses of different colleges and university systems within Europe. As is evident from the Bologna Process' biennial self-assessments, educational institutions remain to some extent autonomous actors, and as such, even amidst a top-down policy agenda promulgated by Europe's education ministers, local responses have produced different outcomes-outcomes that we speculate were not always known to the policymakers when they issued the Bologna Declaration. Indeed, as consistent with our understanding of Page 26.975.5
institutional change as generally being a generative process as well as a top-down policy driven process, the true significance of Bologna is something that is continuing to unfold, as multiple institutional actors seek to transform and define a system as complex as the European system of higher education, and this at different scales. 7 The biennial self-assessment produced by Bologna Process officials do in fact document the different ways in which the process has been unfolding across different countries. These assessments show that while there was initially general resistance to Bologna, higher education institutions in "lesser" countries, and especially in places like Ireland and Scandinavia, began to take up Bologna as a way of drawing in students from the European higher education market. On the other hand, the German Fachhochschulen have also been among the institutions to embrace Bologna; they have done so by extending industrially-oriented, former vocational programs up to the Candidate's level. But as an example of how political processes can operate differently at the national level, the equivalent institution in Denmark, the engineering colleges, have not been allowed to extend their training up to the Candidate's degree, forcing them to seek other strategies for their institutional survival.
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The institutional responses in Denmark provides an important case study for understanding how the Bologna Process has been unfolding in Europe and its implications for the United States. While Denmark is a relatively small member of the EU, the same logic that brought the strongest universities within Europe to remain ambivalent about Bologna has caused universities located in the periphery to embrace student transfers between the lower and higher degree as a means of building enrollments. Given Denmark's scientific and technological strengths, the country may also serve as an important bell-weather for European countries seeking to be a more major player in the "innovation economy." The small size of Denmark has also ensured that the institutional conversations that produce the different responses to Bologna have happened through more direct conversations between the ministries and individual universities as compared to countries where there are multi-campus university systems that add further complexity to these conversations. Precisely because of its size Denmark provides us with a kind of social laboratory within which to map out some of the responses that have been unfolding under Bologna. This being said, the institutional responses in Denmark are complicated enough to provide quite interesting things to report.
The National Responses of Denmark
The unique response of Denmark, along with the other Scandinavian countries, is partly due to their social democratic traditions. While shortly after our visit there were student protests around the planned reductions in government subsidy for students, historically Denmark has spent a large percentage of its wealth on public education. 9 Based on 2009 World Bank data, Denmark spent 8.7% of its GDP on public education, as contrasted against Germany (5.1%), France (5.9%), United Kingdom (5.5%), and the United States (5.2%). Even Sweden (7.3%) and Norway (7.2%) fall below Denmark in general public education expenditures. 10 In a manner unfathomable to those of us in the United States, students receive significant stipends, not just full tuition, for attending college. Denmark's Gini coefficient, a standard measure of national income inequality stands at 24.8, as contrasted against 27.0 for Germany, 32.3 for the United Kingdom, and 45.0 for the United States, although this is no doubt buoyed by restrictive immigration policies.
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Our fieldwork seems to suggest that this basic commitment to public education and a balanced class structure has shaped the Danish national response to Bologna, although not without definite neoliberal elements, with the national focus on innovation economy and heightened attention to universities' fiscal accountability and efficiency. While our knowledge of Danish political history remains limited (and remains informed largely by our interviews), it is our understanding that the new directions in Danish educational policy have been manifested in a series of government decisions, the most significant of which include the establishment of a national Globalisation Council in April 2005; the government's adoption of a national globalization strategy in the document, Progress, Innovation and Cohesion (May 2006) 12 ; and Parliamentary Law No. 562 ("PL 562" hereafter) which set out to merge the nation's 150 specialized semiprofessional colleges into a new system of eight regional "University Colleges." This was done for the purpose of simultaneously expanding educational access, controlling cost, and upholding the status of "medium cycle" bachelor's degrees-generally semi-professional degrees in fields such as teaching or nursing, but also more traditional, craft-oriented programs in engineering. While PL 562 affects primarily the Diplom (baccalaureate) institutions, it has had complex implications for all engineering degree programs and institutions in Denmark.
The tension between neoliberal policies and social welfare principles is also evident in Denmark's early experiences with the Bologna Process. On the one hand, strong central government traditions enabled Denmark to quickly embrace the 1999 Bologna declaration, but this also resulted in a significant policy failure. According to interview with a former rector of an engineering college who had been involved in Danish higher education policymaking, it had been the intent, under Bologna, to off-load some part of the costs of the higher Candidate's (master's) degree to the private sector. The idea was that after the initial three years of college education, assumedly paid for by the government, industry would step in to cover the costs of training their employees in the more specialized degree programs, since new degree programs were being created to meet the specific needs of industry. However, broad expectations on the part of both students and industry that the full costs of higher education would continue to be borne by the state resulted in making Danish per-capita expenditures in higher education one of the highest, if not highest, among EU countries. This has only increased the Education Ministry's resolve to ensure that societal and economic benefits accrue from this tremendous public investment in higher education. 13 As with the logic of European economic integration, bringing better definition to the role of the public sector in producing the advanced workforce needed to compete in a global arena has been central to the neoliberal rhetoric and economic reforms within Europe, and with regards to the Bologna Process in particular.
Since we are implicitly paying attention to issues of economic geography, our conversations with interviewees and our Danish colleagues also touched upon the characteristics of Denmark's transitioning technological sectors that shaped its institutional responses. Denmark has traditionally had significant strengths in electronics, medical technologies, and mobile communications. While some sectors, such as mobile communications, have recently faltered, other areas, especially alternative energy and energy systems, have experienced resurgence amidst global concerns about sustainability and energy self-reliance. Selected segments within some of Denmark's older industries, such as the new work on bio-fuels that grew out of Denmark's traditional strengths in agricultural technology and food processing, have also made a high tech turn. This and other market arenas, especially those centered on specialized service industries (e.g. the New Nordic Cuisine) and design (an area perhaps more relevant to Page 26.975.7
engineering) have buoyed the Danish economy. Meanwhile, a number of more traditional industries, especially international trade and manufacturing in Jutland, have generated a constant demand for a sizable Danish engineering workforce. This stable demand for engineering talent has, for many Danish engineering colleges and universities, provided the tuition resources necessary to underwrite new degree programs and initiatives in engineering education. An engineering workforce shortage of about 8,000 was also anticipated during the coming decade at the time of our interviews.
Overall, it is our assessment that the Danish national response to Bologna can be characterized as follows:
 A decision to embrace the Bologna Process through a desire to introduce market competition, greater specialization, and responsiveness within Denmark's educational institutions, especially at the master's level.
 A decision to address both the a) short term recessionary softening of the labor market and the b) long-term competitiveness of the Danish workforce by having 50% of all high school graduates continue on to Baccalaureate-level (B.Eng. or B.Sc.) instruction, and for 50% of these to obtain the higher Candidate's degree (M.Sc.)
 Simultaneously, an attempt to contain the costs of higher education through the rationalization of higher education, both through the legislatively mandated consolidation of the nation's semi-professional schools (those established for teachers, technicians, nurses and others) into a single University College system, and through fiscal policies designed to force administrative restructuring within the nation's universities. Many nationally funded, not-for-profit research institutes were also absorbed into the nation's universities under the rhetoric of fiscal restraint and rationalization.
At the time of our visit, there was also an effort underway to define an "innovation" agenda that would change how national research funding was allocated to the universities. Released shortly after our visit in December of 2012, this report, Denmark-A Nation of Solutions, sets out to redirect government research expenditures so that public investments in research, innovation, and education translate more effectively into economic growth and jobs creation. Clearly a response to the anxieties caused by the 2008 market collapse that had resulted in a 8% decline in Denmark's GDP, the report points to the challenges of a small country dominated by small and medium enterprises. It calls for strategic investments in research designed to open up new market niches like sustainability and new energy systems, areas that might play to Denmark's existing strengths.
14 In addition, a number of other factors-not all of which involve national government policiesconstitute the overall environment within which Danish educational institutions operate. These factors appeared to shape the responses of all of the universities and engineering colleges that we visited, and involved:
 Geographic factors having to do with the fact that Denmark has one major metropolitan center (Copenhagen), and a large rural-industrial periphery (Jutland  Social democratic commitments to relatively open enrollments within the public university system, which when paired with high matriculation targets for college enrollment, limited mobility, and a rigid system of enrollment based budgeting, continues to limit selectivity within the university system.
The Institutional Responses in Denmark
First of all, we found each of the universities and engineering colleges that we visited actively remaking their institutions in response to the changing policy environment, even as they responded to regional and national opportunities created by new and emerging high-tech arenas.
Before we describe the individual institutional responses below, there is one institutional response that unfolded at an intermediate scale that we need to describe first.
This was the engineering colleges' (Teknika) response to PL 562, a response that also affected the Danish universities. Even prior to PL 562, several other policy decisions had already altered the basic character of Denmark's engineering colleges. The first, according to information contributed during our interviews, was a mandated change in 1992, when IHA, IHK, and all other engineering colleges were made to conform to the German model of the Fachhochschulen. This created a more formal demarcation between Diplom engineers and "academic" engineers (those holding a M.Sc., namely the Candidate's degree). Then, under the influence of Bologna, the four year Diplom degree was compressed into a 3.5 year degree program (which included a ½ year internship), even as university based engineering programs, following Bologna's 3+2 formula, were elevated to the equivalent of a U.S. master's degree. The underlying intent of this change in the engineering colleges was to reduce the total costs of education by accelerating the engineers' entry into the workforce, amidst concerns about engineering workforce shortages.
(This would also apply to engineering students enrolled at the university who ended their degrees with the B.Sc.) 15 Under PL 562, the engineering colleges were originally supposed to be folded into the new University College system. However, at some point in the political process associated with these changes, the exact date of which we did not discern during our interviews, the engineering degrees offered by the nation's Teknika were recognized as full professional degrees. This complicated the engineering colleges' merger into the University College system, since it was a system designed for semi-professional degree programs. Given the professional interests involved, the engineering colleges uniformly opposed the new legislation, and proposed instead to align themselves with the nation's research universities. It was also suggested during our interviews that the engineering colleges were interested in being a player in the new "innovation economy;" consequentially they felt the alignment with the universities could give them access Page 26.975.9
to national research monies. In any case, this shift in focus was subsequently sanctioned by official changes in policy that gave the engineering colleges until 2014 to merge with one of the nation's universities. The reason the universities were willing to accept such an alliance are somewhat varied and complex, but are basically related to the fiscal pressures associated with enrollment-based budgeting and the emphasis on developing degree programs more closely aligned to industrial interests. The specific ramifications of these decisions will be apparent in the discussions about each of the institutions described below.
We now turn to the specific institutional responses, presented here in abbreviated form. For each of the four institutions that we visited, we lay out the major challenges that each institution faced, and their chosen strategy of adapting to the new policy environment. As we have noted above, the full write up of our study will appear in a volume produced by the principal investigators of the PROCEED project, a draft manuscript of which can be provided upon request.
Aalborg University
Aalborg University was founded in 1974 as a direct result of the student movement and the rejection of older, scholastic approaches to higher education. Though now a general university, technical education was and remains a major focus at Aalborg. While the institution has succumbed to academic drift in various ways, with an increased emphasis on sponsored research relative to alternative pedagogies, a broad commitment to project based learning (PBL) remains central to Aalborg's current effort to rebrand the university. As part of an aggressive move to expand enrollments, Aalborg University, which is located in the northern part of Jutland, also opened a new downtown campus in Copenhagen. Quite telling, this campus is housed in a former R&D laboratory for Nokia, which Nokia released as a result of the economic downturn.
The two main challenges for Aalborg University are those of choosing an appropriate growth strategy, and maintaining appropriate balance between their well-established degree programs in Aalborg, and the degree programs created at its new Copenhagen Campus. A former regional university with a focus on industrial education, Aalborg University found it difficult to meet national mandates for higher enrollments. Since governmental fund to universities is based on enrollment, the enrollment level posed serious fiscal challenges for the school. Aalborg's growth remained limited by the migration of students to Copenhagen, a situation only exacerbated by the expanded opportunities for student transfers with Bologna. Opening a campus in Copenhagen and developing strong Candidate's degree programs there provided Aalborg with an opportunity to retain those students, as well as to tap into the larger pool of potential students interested in studying in the city. It also enabled Aalborg to enter into new arenas that could garner national research funding. This emphasis on the Copenhagen campus had however led some to assert that critical needs on the main campus were not being met, leading to additional adjustments in institutional strategy.
The full scope of Aalborg University's current response can be characterized by the following:
 Implementing a School Structure. Aalborg University conducted a major reorganization in recent years, during which it installed a new School structure across the university. Pursued ostensibly in response to the central government mandate to improve operating efficiencies, the new School structure has also given Aalborg University the Page 26.975.10
administrative mechanism needed to make decisions on allocating strategic resources, including more centralized decisions about departmental budgets.
 The Copenhagen Campus. While the organizational changes up north were a necessary step for undertaking bold strategic action, the opening of Aalborg's new Copenhagen Campus represents Aalborg's most aggressive effort to expand enrollments and to reorient their institution around the new "innovation economy." It also amounts to a concerted effort to move beyond Aalborg's historic identity as a regional institution.
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 Changes at the Northern (Main) Campus. Nevertheless, in terms of total enrollments, the university's campus in Aalborg still overshadows the enrollments in Copenhagen by a wide margin. As such, an important part of the growth strategy for Aalborg remains the continuous renewal and revitalization of the degree programs offered at its northern campus, or rather, campuses. While the scope of our visit was limited, we observed, for instance, that the university had decided to open a new downtown campus for the School of Architecture, Design, and Planning in order to attract students who might otherwise move to Copenhagen for their studies. Leased or recently acquired off-campus facilities for a new focus on nanotechnology, as well as a highly specialized master's level program in Energy Planning, also points to programs that play to new opportunities opened up by Bologna.
Aarhus University
At the time of our visit, the single greatest challenge for Aarhus University and the former Ingeniørhøjskolen i Århus (IHA) lay with the successful integration of these two institutions, in completing the mandated absorption of the former engineering colleges into the university system. Just to provide some necessary background, IHA opened its doors as a technician training school in 1828, and became one of the nation's largest Teknika. IHA "made engineers" for well over a century, seeking to provide for central Jutland's industrial workforce needs, even as it sought to ensure the "social betterment" of working class boys who obtained secondary education in a trade school instead of an academically-oriented (college preparatory) high school. 17 Meanwhile, Aarhus University operates as a general university with 36,000 full time students and 8,500 continuing education students, making it second in size only to Copenhagen University in Denmark. It is also important to note that Aarhus University had no engineering school at the time of the initial merger in 2007. However, the precise articulation agreement necessary to produce a coherent education required more close coordination. As carried out as part of a broader, university-wide reorganization, the faculty of both entities now report to a single Dean of Engineering. The neoliberal impulse behind the reorganization also resulted in a general streamlining of the degree programs offered by Aarhus. For engineering, this resulted in a decision to reorient the curriculum around mostly general (traditional) engineering disciplines, which meant letting go of some of the more specialized B.Eng. degree programs previously offered by IHA. This represents a significant wager and commitment to the idea that the adaptability of Denmark's engineering workforce can best be accomplished through more rigorous training in the fundamentals. Industrial experience and internships remain important features within the IHA curriculum.
 Research and the New Harbor Campus. At the time of our visit, Aarhus University was in the process of opening a new downtown campus located along the harbor. The intent of this new facility was to house several of the most interdisciplinary degree programs, such as those in Information Technology and Healthcare Technology, where School of Engineering faculty would have offices side by side with the former IHA faculty. In a manner consistent with the curricular focus on fundamentals, Aarhus University's vision of interdisciplinary is based on assembling teams of engineers and specialists from various basic disciplines, as opposed to seeking out faculty with interdisciplinary training. Having a mix of faculty with an interest in fundamental research and industrial application and experience is also seen as an asset. 
Ingeniørhøjskolen i København (IHK)
At the time of our visit, IHK was still a separate entity from DTU. Given the significant differences in IHK and DTU's interests and orientation, we report on the two institutions separately.
Similar to IHA, the Copenhagen College of Engineering opened its doors as a technician training school, evolving to graduate its first lot of professional engineers in 1881. The College was established explicitly as an alternative to the polytechnic orientation of DTU, whose graduates typically secured elite public sector employment leaving unfulfilled the engineering workforce requirements of Copenhagen's still sizable engineering industries. From 1905, IHK, under different names, functioned as one of the twelve Teknika operating in Denmark. 19 Like IHA, IHK's principal challenge lay with navigating successfully through the mandated merger with a university. But while the demographic and fiscal challenges for IHK are on the surface similar to those of IHA, there are significant differences that produced different outcomes. First, as the sole remaining engineering college in the metropolitan environs of Copenhagen, IHK stood as the beneficiary, not victim, of the internal (national) migration of Danish youth. However, the diversified economic activities of a major metropolitan region also created greater competition with degree programs other than engineering. Moreover, the very success of Denmark's social democratic commitments to social mobility resulted in fewer students arriving with craft backgrounds; it was estimated that 80% of the students entering IHK have taken the standard gymnasial (high school) entrance exams, as opposed to advancing from a former trade-oriented high school. In this context, the traditional, industrially oriented degree programs of IHK lost much of their luster, resulting in a general decline in enrollments.
These demographic and geographic differences brought IHK to respond as follows:
 Merger. The former, former Rektor (President) of IHK, Fleming Krogh, had helped to create the University College system. While it is not entirely clear whether he had intended from the outset to fold the Teknika into the new system of University Colleges, those who supported the scheme, or went along with it, no doubt viewed it as a necessary compromise given that they were blocked from the path adopted by the German Fachhochschulen.
Initially, IHK decided to pursue a merger with Aalborg University. In an arrangement born straight out of the original vision for Bologna, it was the intent that many of IHK's B.Eng. recipients would continue to obtain a Candidate's degree through several years of additional study paid for by a regional employer. This was an arrangement that also gave Aalborg University its initial entry into the Candidate's degree program market in Copenhagen.
When this arrangement failed to bear fruit or to reverse IHK's downward enrollment trend, IHK, under a new Rektor, Connie Simonsen, decided to terminate its arrangement with Aalborg University and to instead seek a merger with DTU. While the exact reason for this shift is somewhat open to speculation, there appeared to be a policy disconnect between IHK, which hoped that many students would seek industrial employment Page 26.975.13
immediately upon receiving their B.Eng. degree, and Aalborg University's desire to have at least half of the students continue straight on to the Candidate's degree. This also had various curricular implications. Simonsen reasoned that by proactively approaching DTU, they could preserve more of what was distinctive about IHK's industrially-oriented B.Eng. degree program. DTU has in fact honored the separation, allowing the former IHK to service most B.Eng. degree programs, including those that were being offered by DTU itself, while the Candidate's degree has been left to the DTU faculty.
 Other Responses: While the strategic merger arrangements occupied a significant part of the IHK administration and faculty's attention, IHK also pursued other strategies for revitalizing their academic programs, partly in an attempt to improve their profile going into the merger. This included a decision to launch three new degree programs in Health Technology, Sustainable Energy, and (Industrial) Process and Innovation. Many of these programs represented efforts to repackage and rebrand existing programs in ways that fit with the Bologna Process' emphasis on creating a more specialized, globally competitive workforce. These changes had in fact helped to reverse recent enrollment trends, so that IHK was already enjoying healthy enrollment growth by 2012. At 1,700 students, IHK's enrollments compared favorably to the 2,000 students who were enrolled in a B.Eng. degree program at DTU.
DTU
We note once again that because of a conflict between one of PROCEED's co-investigators and the DTU administration, we did not have access to senior members within DTU's administration. Nevertheless, given DTU's importance and stature in Danish engineering education, we report on what we were able to discern about this institution through conversations with its faculty.
Clearly, the single greatest challenge for DTU rests with charting a proper course for Denmark's leading technological university amidst the general remaking of European higher education. For those unfamiliar with DTU, it is one of the world's leading research universities, and it competes head-to-head with the best technological universities and polytechnics in Germany, France, and elsewhere. Established in 1829 under the model of the French École Polytechnique, DTU, from the outset, emphasized a more formal approach to engineering and engineering education. This continues to this day. On the other hand, because of Denmark's strong social democratic traditions, DTU has been cast in a somewhat different mold from the other European TUs. Despite its elite status, open admissions policies in Denmark, along with fiscal policies that compel Danish universities to compete for enrollments, have made DTU a far less selective institution than their counterparts elsewhere. Moreover, even prior to the IHK merger, DTU decided to develop its own B.Eng. programs in an attempt to expand enrollments. 20 While our limited access leads us to present these results with less certainty, DTU's institutional response strategies might be characterized as follows:
 Disciplinary Retrenchment. DTU's primary response to recessionary contractions in the national higher education budget seems to be that of disciplinary retrenchment. Amidst mandated improvements in administrative efficiency, DTU streamlined its organization by consolidating multiple units into a smaller number of "institutes," or academic Page 26.975.14 departments. This led to an emphasis on more traditional academic disciplines, as opposed to creating specialized degree programs tied to industrial interests. Specialized programs do exist as full degree plan options within the major departments.  Governance. Our final observation about DTU has to do with the more delicate issue of governance. The language employed in the DTU website demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, the effects of neoliberal influence on the administrative structure at DTU. References to phrases such as an "unbroken chain of command," and "line and staff organization" indicate a shift in academic culture away from the strong tradition of faculty autonomy that characterized many Danish academic institutions in the past. 21 The expansion of the central administration and its authority is consistent with the greater need for strategic planning and coordination under Bologna, and it may be a necessary correction given Cold War assumptions about faculty autonomy and research. Nevertheless, given the stature and historic autonomy of the faculty at DTU, the felt effects of these changes appear to be quite pronounced.
Implications for Engineering Education in the U.S.
The changes in Denmark indicate some important lessons about the new trends in European higher education. Granted, not all the changes there have been perfect. Even in Denmark, professional and institutional interests have shaped local responses in ways that may or may not be entirely aligned with national interests. Nevertheless, the multiple experiments carried out in Danish higher education institutions represent a significant achievement under Bologna. Even if individual strategies turn out to be counterproductive-and this might be the case for Aalborg University's overaggressive expansion or DTU's decision to sticking to their strengths-the diverse institutional responses suggests that different strategic directions are being tried out. Even if some strategies fail, the most successful ones are likely to sustain and be emulated by the others.
The Bologna Process has enabled-and some would say forced-countries like Denmark to restructure its systems of higher education, and through this process, reexamine its policy priorities. More strikingly, these efforts led to radically different solutions for Danish higher education institutions to reposition themselves in a global economy. From our observation, Danish universities have also developed a new institutional capability to weigh policy priorities and forge local strategies for change. While some of this entailed corrections to inefficiencies within Denmark's educational system-an outdated commitment to trade oriented education, limited enrollments at the university level, and the autonomy granted to faculty under older, Cold War ideas about basic research-Danish higher education institutions appear to be restructuring its system of engineering and technological education in ways that are more fluid than here in the United States. While we hesitate from making any guesses about the future, we see in Denmark an earnest effort to place greater emphasis on the Candidate's (master's) degree, as suggested under Bologna. Of the four institutions we studied, Aalborg University appeared to be moving most aggressively in this direction, especially by embracing more specialized master's degrees that are tied to new and emerging industries, although the different approaches taken by both Aarhus and DTU also merit careful evaluation.
We recognize not all of Europe is making significant progress under Bologna. Indeed, Denmark, as a small, social democratic country with an unusually high commitment to higher education, has found it possible to pursue changes that other European countries may be slower to adopt. Still, we regard Denmark to be an important bell weather, in pointing to the kind of changes that might continue to occur elsewhere under Bologna, a process that emerged in the context of European Integration and a desire to produce a "harmonized" EU higher education market, in order to produce the highly trained and specialized workforce necessary for Europe's economic resurgence. Most European countries, nearly all of whom are signatories to the Bologna Process, view this as part of the push to bring Europe into the new "innovation economy." Should the Bologna Process be entirely successful, it will accomplish what has been the elusive goal set forth by our own society since at least the 1968 Goals Report, namely that of making the master's degree the standard professional degree in engineering. 22 Historically the United States has prided itself in college attendance rates, and there has been a steady drift towards master's level training through market mechanisms, which operate alongside the logic (if not always the reality) of ever increasing technological complexity. However, there are now member EU nations that strive to see 50% of their high school graduates obtain a "medium-cycle" 3-year degree, and 50% of those to complete the higher Candidate's degree. Some, including Denmark, have already surpassed this goal. Were we to be alarmist, which we do not recommend for reasons that we turn to immediately below, we might also note how engineering education at American universities, as anchored by its public land grant institutions Page 26.975.16
including Purdue, remain institutionally affixed to an undergraduate model of engineering education, and this amidst the general contraction in public spending for higher education. Given that both us study engineering education, we are well aware of the tremendous impact that our land grant institutions have had on the development of engineering and industrial capacity in the United States. Our commitment to land grant institutions augmented our engineering workforce, and through broad emulation across many public institutions, remade engineering into a significant vehicle for upward (White, and later Asian male) social mobility. However, we need to ask whether this strategy, with its emphasis on undergraduate education, still matches up with present economic and demographic realities.
As critical social scientists, we recognize the complex impacts of economic globalization and the need to scrutinize the rhetoric surrounding globalization. 23 Nevertheless, if the current decline in U.S. public commitment to higher education is the result of policy drift and the lack of relevant imaginaries about what our system of higher education can accomplish, then we do invite the kind of public discussions that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s under the influence of Sputnik. In the United States, market institutions will no doubt continue to shape the public discourse surrounding education. Nevertheless it is our hope that a broad public discussion will help move us away from our current obsession with foreign higher education markets, institutional income, and market efficiencies, and bring us to more genuine conversations about the social good. We encourage everyone in our society to add to the conversation. 
